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I.

INTRODUCTION

The advertising and promotion of a diverse array of medical
products to consumers has been an established part of American
1
culture for decades, particularly so for the advertising and
promotion of prescription and over-the-counter drugs. Efforts by
federal agencies, such as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), to restrict this type of commercial speech invariably have
†
MD, JD, Professor of Law, Director of Health Law & Policy, Yonsei Law
School, Seoul, Korea.
1. See Scott H. Podolsky & Jeremy A. Greene, A Historical Perspective of
Pharmaceutical Promotion and Physician Education, 300 JAMA 831, 831 (2008).
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crashed on the rocks of the Hudson, almost without regard to how
uninformative, misleading, or less than completely truthful such
3
advertising to consumers has been. Efforts to rein in this practice
have invariably been judged by federal courts to not be tailored
narrowly enough to outweigh the purported but unproven benefits
4
of such practices, or to justify chipping away at the constitutional
pedestal of protection of commercial speech on which direct-toconsumer advertising (DTCA) of medical products stands.
Although purely false advertising does not enjoy First
5
Amendment protection, almost anything above this low bar has
been difficult to suppress, at least in the arena of food and drugs.
In general, court decisions have usually determined that the
alleged potential proclaimed benefits of DTCA—education of
citizens, improvement of the physician-patient relationship,
6
vigorous defense against efforts to limit freedom of expression —
outweigh the alleged risks posed by limiting this type of
commercial speech. Of the three claimed benefits society enjoys
from DTCA, the potential to educate health consumers (i.e., real
people) is by far the most important. Commercial speech enjoys
much less protection, in general, than an individual’s freedom of
speech, and the blizzard of negative press in the past decade about
the relationship between academic medicine and the
7
pharmaceutical industry would seem to make any claimed
favorable effect of DTCA on the physician-patient relationship a
stretch at best. The same holds true for the relationship between
medical device manufacturers and the surgeons or surgical

2. Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
3. Id. Although the Central Hudson standard for review of commercial
speech protection is two-pronged, with the first test being whether the regulated
speech is misleading or concerns an illegal activity (and if so, the speech receives
no constitutional protection), Id. at 563–64, virtually any television advertisement
for a prescription drug could be found to be misleading in the manner in which
serious drug side effects are presented and in which any discussion of whether, on
balance, such serious side effects outweigh the sometimes negligible benefits
obtained from taking the drug product. There are some apparent standards for
what constitutes a fair and balanced pharmaceutical ad, but the same claim cannot
be made for restricted implantable medical devices.
4. Id. at 567–72.
5. DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 154 (3d ed. 2010).
6. Id. at 150–52.
7. Podolsky & Greene, supra note 1, at 831; see also Wayne L. Pines, A History
and Perspective of Direct-to-Consumer Promotion, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 489 (1999).
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specialty groups who use their products.
The bottom line is that it is really only the potential to educate
consumers about the potential benefits (and risks) of medical
devices that justifies efforts to protect such commercial speech
from attempts by state and federal agencies to restrict (or even
ban) it. For this reason, the information contained in medical
device advertisements and the information that should be
contained in such ads to really educate a consumer, is one area in
which this article will focus. The focus here will also be exclusively
on prescription, restricted, surgically implanted medical devices—
cardiac pacemakers, artificial knees and hips, coronary artery
stents, biliary tract stents, and so forth.
The reasons are
straightforward. These medical devices are the most likely to have
undergone some sort of clinical testing; are among the most
expensive (and potentially lucrative) on the market; are the most
likely to be advertised to consumers by medical centers and
surgeons or surgical groups seeking patient referrals and a
marketing advantage; are usually the most dangerous; and, lastly,
are those devices in which the morbidity of the device is a function
not only of the inherent properties of the device itself but also the
skill of the surgeon and the facility in which the device is implanted
in the patient. Although technically not permanently implanted in
patients, nor restricted in the sense that they reached the market
via a premarket approval (PMA), robotic surgical systems such as
the da Vinci are complex surgical devices that are temporarily
inserted into patients and are prescription devices; that is, they can
only be used under the direct supervision of an operating surgeon.
These devices will be mentioned as well in this article, as there is
literature on the accuracy of DTCA claims for this product.
The importance of the medical device industry, and of the
advertising of devices, cannot be overstated. The topic of DTCA of
medical devices in general, and restricted, surgically implanted
devices in particular, deserves a closer look. There are several good
reasons for this.
First, the medical device industry in the United States has
grown, and continues to grow, almost exponentially over the last
8. Senate investigators say Medtronic helped write medical journal articles
promoting bone graft. Michelle Fay Cortez & Drew Armstrong, Medtronic
Manipulated Bone Product Data, Senate Panel Says, WASH. POST, Oct.
25, 2012, http://washpost.bloomberg.com/Story?docId=1376-MCFN7M0UQVI901
-3A6GLRR45DE8GQBSDJ5GNEFQ1C.
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two decades and now is at the tip of the spear of the medical
technology juggernaut in the United States. Despite this, the
enabling statute that effectively defined and regulates the medical
device industry—the 1976 Medical Device Amendments to the 1938
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act—has remained largely
unchanged in the basic manner in which medical devices are
classified and the mechanisms by which they may reach United
States consumers. Second, the wide diversity of new medical
devices and the engineering complexity of medical devices
(including restricted, surgically implanted medical devices) is a
quantum leap over previous generations. Despite this, some
innovative and potentially dangerous medical devices still reach
United States markets via the abbreviated 510(k) clearance
mechanism. This mechanism requires no independent testing for
either safety or effectiveness and allows many new medical devices
to reach consumers merely by the sponsor briefly claiming that its
new device is substantially equivalent to an already-marketed
predicate medical device, which may be many generations afield
from the new device and may no longer be either the gold standard
or remotely relevant in terms of potential morbidity to the new
device. Third, as with prescription drugs there is a substantial
amount of off-label use of restricted, surgically implanted medical
devices; by virtue of coming under the practice of medicine, this
activity remains outside the FDA’s direct regulatory control. And as
with off-label use of prescription drugs, this activity for medical
devices shows no sign of slowing down. Lastly, as the medical
device industry has expanded, DTCA and promotion of certain
medical devices has begun to emerge.
II. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR MEDICAL DEVICE
CLASSIFICATION AND REGULATION OF ADVERTISING
The FDA assumed direct regulatory authority over medical
9
devices as a result of the 1976 Medical Device Amendments to the
10
1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Medical devices are
classified into one of three classes (I, II, and III) based on safety
11
risk, with class III devices being the most dangerous.
Medical
9. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
10. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040
(1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 331–397 (2006)).
11. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1).
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devices can either be marketed directly (e.g., a new kind of tongue
depressor) without any direct FDA involvement; be cleared for
marketing via a 510(k) mechanism, which allows a new medical
device to be sold if it is found to be substantially equivalent to an
existing medical device already on the market; or approved
12
following submission of a PMA, which unlike the 510(k) clearance
actually requires substantial, new clinical trial data on safety and
efficacy. There are labeling requirements for both 510(k)- and
PMA-approved device marketing, but the requirements for the
latter are more stringent.
Another layer in the FDA medical device regulatory
mechanism is the concept of the restricted, as well as the
prescription, medical device. Most non–class I medical devices are
prescription medical devices, which are approved either via 510(k)
clearance or PMA and which are defined as devices that the FDA
deems safe only if used under the supervision of a licensed medical
13
practitioner.
Prescription medical devices are subject to FDA
labeling requirements that, among other things, require labeling
that includes adequate information for use associated with the
14
device in order for the device to not be considered misbranded.
Because labeling encompasses brochures and promotional
materials sent to physicians and consumers, in addition to the
15
medical device label itself, this means that medical device
manufacturers are liable for the absence of such information in
DTCA of their devices. The statute does not apply to physicians,
surgical groups, hospitals, or academic medical centers when they
are doing the promotion for the device as part of marketing
activities since FDA regulations are intended only for industry, and
promotional practices are an aspect of medical practice regulated
16
by individual state medical boards.
Restricted medical devices are a subset of prescription medical
devices. A restricted device is subject to general prescription
medical device labeling requirements but is also subject to
12.
13.
14.

Id. § 360e.
21 C.F.R. § 801.109 (2011); see also 21 U.S.C. § 352(f).
21 U.S.C. § 352(r)(2); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: ALTERNATIVE TO CERTAIN
PRESCRIPTION
DEVICE
LABELING
REQUIREMENTS
(2000),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance
/GuidanceDocuments/ucm072748.pdf.
15. Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 349 (1948).
16. Cf. 21 U.S.C. § 396.
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additional requirements on sale, use, distribution, or advertising.
These additional restrictions may be imposed by the PMA, which
17
authorizes the sale of the device, or by a separate regulation that
recognizes that the device has a particular potential for harm or the
device is so complicated to use that special measures are necessary
to ensure that it is used properly and safely. These are the only two
ways prescription devices are also considered restricted medical
devices.
Some, but not all, surgically implanted restricted medical
devices have reached consumers via PMAs. Innovative, new,
groundbreaking surgically implanted medical devices for which
there is no predicate device—an already existing, marketed device
to which the new device must be determined to be substantially
equivalent—must do so via this route exclusively. In the past, some
surgically implanted medical devices have reached the market via
the 510(k) clearance mechanism.
Since these devices are
prescription devices but not restricted devices (because they were
not approved via a PMA nor specified as restricted by specific
regulation), this creates a problem whenever these devices are
advertised and promoted by the manufacturer. The reason for this
is straightforward: the FDA has specific authority (by statute) to
regulate advertising of restricted medical devices but does not have
general statutory authority to regulate all other medical device
18
advertising.
This means that some surgically implanted device
advertising cannot be regulated by the FDA if the device is not a
restricted one. This could be the case for a complex, surgically
implanted class III device that reached the market via 510(k)
clearance because there was a predicate device on the market to
which it was substantially equivalent, even if the two devices are so
dissimilar that, under ideal circumstances, de novo clinical trials
demonstrating efficacy and safety should be required. Although
there are supposed to be calls by the FDA for submission of PMAs
19
for such devices to correct this lag, the problem persists.
For those surgically implanted class III medical devices that
have reached consumers via PMA and that have been appropriately
17. Id. §§ 352(e), 360j(f). Only a handful of medical devices have been
specifically designated as restricted by separate regulation. One example is ASRs,
specific reagents used for complex testing in certain laboratories. Another
example is hearing aids. Restricted medical devices almost always are designated
as such in the PMA.
18. Id. § 352(q)–(r).
19. See id. § 360e(a)(1), (i).
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classified as restricted, the FDA has the statutory authority to
regulate the advertising and promotion of such devices to
consumers. In general, the advertising of such devices cannot be
20
“false or misleading in any particular.”
For this reason, the
general guidelines for medical devices mirror, though not exactly,
those for prescription drugs.
Advertisements for medical devices, for which the FDA does
have statutory authority to regulate the promotion of, must also do
two things: (1) state the established name of the medical device;
and (2) contain “a brief statement of the intended uses of the
device and relevant warnings” and precautions regarding safety—
side effects of the device, precautions when using the device, and
21
contraindications for employing the device. These are minimum
requirements; under the terms of the PMA, additional specific
advertising restrictions or requirements may be imposed on the
22
manufacturer.
The brief-statement requirement of the restricted medical
device advertising requirement has undergone some adjustment by
the FDA. The FDA issued draft guidance in 2004 to help medical
device manufacturers who advertise their restricted medical devices
23
directly to consumers. It contained recommendations for content
that closely mimics prescription DTCA requirements governing
broadcast media such as television, radio, and telephone-based
24
advertising. DTCA would comply with the FDA’s guidance if it:
disclose[d] the most serious and most common risks
associated with the device in either the audio or audio
and visual parts of the presentation, and [made] adequate
provision for dissemination of the approved package
labeling in connection with the broadcast presentation
(e.g., reprinting the labeling in magazine advertisements
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. § 352(q)(1).
Id. § 352(r) (emphasis added).
Id. § 360e(d)(B)(ii).
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA: CONSUMER-DIRECTED BROADCAST ADVERTISING OF
RESTRICTED DEVICES (2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/98fr
/04d-0042-gdl0003.pdf. Although this draft guidance document has been
withdrawn for administrative reasons, the underlying statutory provisions remain
unchanged and so the steps discussed in the document are still relevant to
industry for purposes of complying with the statutory requirements.
24. See id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CONSUMER-DIRECTED BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS
(1999), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/00/backgrd/3627b2bl
.pdf (covering advertising of prescription drugs).
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and/or providing an 800 number that viewers can call to
25
request that it be read or mailed to them).
How well does this regulatory scheme play out in the real
world? To answer this question, some data should be reviewed and
commentary should be made about what the world of DTCA of
restricted, surgically implanted medical devices looks like in the
United States in 2012.
III. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON RESTRICTED, SURGICALLY IMPLANTED
MEDICAL DEVICES DTCA: HOW MUCH IS OUT THERE, WHO IS DOING
THE ADVERTISING, AND WHERE DOES THE ADVERTISING APPEAR?
At the time of this writing, there were no substantive data
published in either medical literature or law journals on the
prevalence and characteristics of the relatively new phenomenon of
DTCA of restricted, surgically implanted medical devices. The
topic of DTCA of medical devices, whether restricted, implantable,
or otherwise, has without question been a below-the-radar-screen
issue when compared to the decades-old controversy over DTCA of
prescription pharmaceuticals.
For example, the definitive
26
casebook on food and drug law devotes less than a paragraph to
promotion of devices, whereas DTCA of prescription drugs merits
more than fifty pages of text and commentary. The text, Medical
Device Regulation & Compliance, edited by Terman and O’Flaherty,
provides a definition of advertising and labeling and, later in the
text, provides an accurate and concise summary of the statutory
requirements that must be met by such advertising but otherwise
27
does not discuss the topic in any depth.
28
This author’s preliminary observations in 2009 represented
the first attempt to begin to define some of the legal issues
surrounding this area of food and drug law. That publication
explored some of the unique aspects of the involvement of the
25. Jeffrey K. Shapiro, Labeling and Advertising of Medical Devices, in
PROMOTION OF BIOMEDICAL PRODUCTS: REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS 1, 14 (Thomas
E. Colonna & Jeffrey K. Shapiro eds., 2006).
26. See PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERILL & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD
AND DRUG LAW (3d ed. 2008).
27. Evan P. Phelps, Medical Device Labeling and Advertising, in MEDICAL DEVICE
REGULATION & COMPLIANCE 23, 24, 32 (Stephen D. Terman & Neil F. O’Flaherty
eds., 2010).
28. Bruce Patsner, Problems Associated with Direct-to-Consumer Advertising
(DTCA) of Restricted, Implantable Medical Devices: Should the Current Regulatory
Approach be Changed?, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1 (2009).
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medical profession (physicians, surgical groups, hospitals) in
advertising for high-technology, surgically implanted medical
devices on behalf of industry; discussed some of the problems with
the information gap consumers face in interpreting the
information (if any) contained in an advertisement for a restricted,
29
surgically implanted medical device; and, lastly, commented at
great length on current FDA guidelines and issues facing the FDA
in regulating DTCA of devices. Aside from one sentence about
state regulatory actions against physicians (and, by implication,
hospitals and medical centers) who fraudulently promote the
unproven efficacy and safety benefits of some devices, much of the
focus was on potential First Amendment issues.
All well and good, but the relative scarcity of writing on DTCA
of devices raises two other important issues, which have also not
been addressed. The first is the paucity of information about the
prevalence of DTCA of restricted, surgically implanted medical
devices: How much advertising is an average consumer exposed to?
Who is doing the advertising, and where is the advertising
(television, radio, magazines, billboards) being done?
In
addressing this first question, it is important to keep in mind that
we are talking about the promotion of medical devices to
consumers, not to physicians.
The second question derives from the first question: If the
advertising itself and the entity doing the advertising for restricted,
surgically implanted medical devices differ significantly from the
DTCA of prescription drugs, then whose regulatory problem is it,
the FDA’s or the states’? In other words, if most or all of the
promoting is done not by the medical device industry itself, but
rather by surrogates such as physicians, surgical groups, hospitals,
and academic medical centers, then the FDA should not be held
accountable for failing to police the promotion. And, if this is the
case, then prevention of consumer fraud, not protection of the
First Amendment rights of corporations against government
encroachment, is where the battle line should be drawn.
A.

Prevalence and Publications

During a three-month period of time when the author was
consulting, traveling cross-country, living in three major
metropolitan areas (New York, Houston, and Denver), and
29.

Id. at 38.
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researching and drafting this manuscript, a determined effort was
made to look for any advertising for restricted, surgically implanted
medical devices in the United States in order to get a sense of how
much advertising of such devices an average adult might be
30
exposed to, and how it compared to DTCA of prescription drugs.
Particular attention was paid to who was doing the advertising
(surgeon or surgical group, hospital, medical center) and what
medium such advertising appeared in. Travel during the summer
of 2012 included airline flights (three flights from New Jersey to
California, three flights from Texas to Colorado, three flights from
New Jersey to Texas, and one flight from New York to Florida) and
three cross-country drives (Colorado to Texas, Texas to Boston,
and New Jersey to Colorado). With the exception of the Pacific
Northwest, every area of the United States was visited. When not
traveling, the author watched a minimum of six hours of non-cable
television a day and listened to two hours of afternoon radio five
31
days a week. Air travel involved a steady exposure to in-flight and
airport magazines; interstate auto travel involved exposure to
billboards. The Internet was specifically excluded from this
observation set. No DTCA of restricted, surgically implanted
medical devices was observed in any national newspapers, though
the only paper read on a daily basis was The New York Times.
Although no effort was made to perform a definitive
quantitative, statistical analysis of the differences among advertising
for different medical products, three observations about DTCA of
these select restricted medical devices could easily, and definitively,
be made. Based on these observations, there are clearly some very
unique aspects of the manner in which medical devices,
particularly surgical and surgically implanted devices, are promoted
to consumers when compared to the manner in which prescription
drugs are advertised.
First, the amount of DTCA of medical devices one is exposed
to on a daily basis is much, much lower than the amount one is
exposed to of advertising to consumers for prescription drugs.
During the ninety days of observation, fewer than three dozen

30. The number of advertisements in the United States for over-the-counter
preparations involving the gastrointestinal tract and its manifestations—flatulence,
diarrhea, constipation, hemorrhoids, and acid reflux—one is exposed to in three
months simply defies mathematics.
31. The author does not recommend this level of exposure to advertising or
television as part of a healthy lifestyle.
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different medical device ads were seen compared to literally
hundreds of drug ads seen each week. Average citizens are
exposed to prescription drug promotions on a daily and constant
basis whether one watches television, listens to radio, or reads
magazines. Second, during three months of looking, the author
was able to find only one DTCA for a restricted, surgically
32
implanted medical device by the manufacturer itself; all other
advertisements were by individual surgeons, subspecialty surgical
33
groups, hospitals, or large medical centers. This finding was not
surprising.
The notion of industry advertising by medical
professional surrogates was emphasized in legal writings on DTCA
34
of medical devices, and it represents one of the major differences
(other than sheer volume of advertising) between DTCA of
prescription drugs and devices.
Third, and just as important as the phenomenon of surrogate
advertising, is the medium in which DTCA of restricted,
implantable medical devices takes place. Unlike advertising for
prescription and over-the-counter drugs, which has an
35
overwhelming presence on television, DTCA of restricted,
32. This was an advertisement for an artificial knee by Stryker Corporation.
The advertisement consisted of a group of elderly men attempting to bowl with
oval bowling balls. The point of the advertisement was ostensibly to point out that
since the human knee is round (not oval) the artificial knee you have implanted
should be round as well. This advertisement contained no other vital information
(efficacy, safety, or a picture of the actual artificial knee device itself) and assumed
that (1) the human knee joint is round and (2) an average non-medical person
would know this. Although an average person might know that the kneecap is
round, it is not clear how the concept of round actually matches up to a joint that
is a hinge. A similar ad is available online. See Stryker Corp., GetAroundKnee
Bowling TV Commercial, YOUTUBE (July 26, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch
?v=anrTJMwED5I.
33. The particular surgeons, surgical groups, hospitals, or academic medical
centers are somewhat region-specific when one looks at billboard advertising and
radio advertising, although it is not rare to find advertisements for nationally
prominent medical centers (such as MD Anderson Cancer Center in Houston)
and their technologies on billboards in neighboring states such as Oklahoma,
Arkansas, and Louisiana from which they draw out-of-state patients. In-flight
airline magazines, such as Southwest Airlines, carry advertisements for local
surgical groups (depending on the route) as well as larger specialty groups and
hospitals, which are attempting to expand their referral group nationally.
34. See Patsner, supra note 28, at 19.
35. There is a large amount of DTCA of prescription and over-the-counter
drugs as well as dietary supplements in consumer magazines, though the drugs
advertised depend on the magazines (e.g., birth control pills and hormone
replacement therapy in women’s magazines and erectile dysfunction drugs and
supplements in magazines which men are more likely to read).
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surgically implanted medical devices is a very rare occurrence on
television. In the three-month period of observation of surgically
implanted medical device advertisements, only one of the
promotions took place on television; this was the solitary
advertisement by the manufacturer itself. It is entirely possible to
never see or hear DTCA for medical devices (particularly restricted,
surgically implanted medical devices) on television or radio for
months at a stretch.
However, if one travels on major interstate highways,
particularly near large urban areas or near academic medical
centers, one can see billboards for hospitals or academic medical
centers advertising their cutting-edge medical technologies (e.g.,
gamma-knife radiation therapy units, robotic surgical systems,
spinal implants). Billboard advertisements by the manufacturer of
radiation therapy machines may also be observed in prominent
places near passenger drop-off points at major airports, though
these billboards are not for surgically implanted devices and
provide no useful information other than the name of the
36
company and a picture of the machine.
By contrast, highway
billboard advertisements for prescription drugs are rarely seen.
The one common area in which both prescription drugs ads and
37
ads for restricted, surgically implanted medical devices are seen
seems to be in magazines, airline magazines in particular.
In summary, advertisements for restricted, surgically implanted
medical devices are rarely television ads, are almost always by a
member or institution of the medical profession that markets the
device to prospective patients, and occur much, much less
commonly than ads for prescription drugs. The ads themselves—
the type of ad, the content of the ad, and the accuracy of the ad—
as well as the FDA statutory requirements for content of a DTCA,
will now be examined.

36. For example, the author has observed and advertisement at the Logan
International Airport (Bos.) by Variant for their radiation therapy products.
37. For example, the August 2012 issue of Spirit (Southwest Airlines’ in-flight
magazine) contained no ads for prescription drugs, but it had medical device ads
for Saint Thomas Hospital (Nashville, TN) and the Unity System for brain surgery
(manufacturer not specified) as well as the infuriating spread of “the best Lasik
Surgeons in America” with the disclaimer in small print at the top, “These doctors
are among . . . .” Advertising for surgeons, and advertising for medical devices, go
hand in hand. Advertisement, The Best Lasik Surgeons in America, SPIRIT, Aug. 2012,
at 123.
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Content and Accuracy of Information

The content of the observed medical device advertisements to
consumers appears to be diametrically opposed to that seen for
prescription drug promotions. Perhaps because of who is doing
the advertising—a surgical group, hospital, or academic medical
center—the content of the advertisement is invariably limited to
the name of the medical device product, often accompanied by
either a picture of the device itself, a physician/surgeon who is
presumably involved in using or inserting the device, or both, as
well as the affiliate institution or medical group where they are
based. The name of the manufacturer may or may not be
prominently placed, and the indications (i.e., specific medical or
surgical conditions for which patients might be able to judge if they
are a suitable candidate) usually are absent. Most importantly,
there is a universal absence of any information related to safety or
risk.
In three months of constant travel and observation of (the few
visible) restricted, surgically implanted medical device DTCA in the
United States, the author did not see a single promotion that
complied with the recommendations the FDA issued in its 2004
38
guidance document.
The only televised DTCA by the
manufacturer of the medical device itself, which was observed
during the entire ninety-day observation period by the author, was
a New York City area prime-time advertisement by Stryker for its
implantable artificial knee medical device. The advertisement
comprised a group of elderly men at a bowling alley attempting to
knock down pins with an oval, instead of a round, bowling bowl.
The ostensible purpose of the ad was that the Stryker artificial knee
was better than alternatives (not mentioned) because it was round
instead of oblong, just like the knee. The ad failed to mention
indications for use of the device, contraindications to use of the
device, risks associated with insertion of the medical device, how
long the device would last. The ad also did not contain an advisory
warning (to talk to your physician/surgeon), contact information
39
for the company, or a website to visit.
By contrast, a routine printed or televised prescription drug
advertisement contains enormous amounts of printed or broadcast
38. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra
note 23.
39. Stryker Corp., supra note 32.
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safety information as well as the indications for the drug. The drug
advertisements always have a 1-800 number to dial for more
information about the drug, a website to go to in order to obtain
safety and efficacy information about the drug, as well as the
labeled indication for use of the drug, and a statement to contact
your physician to discuss questions about whether the drug is right
40
for you.
The absurdity of the medical device ad as either
educational or informative, in addition to its gross failure to comply
with regulatory requirements, is only exacerbated by the fact that
the knee is a hinge joint and that the only structure in the knee
that is ovoid (the knee cap or patella) is neither perfectly round
nor oval (it’s almost square) and has no equivalent structure in an
artificial knee at all. This further assumes the average consumer
would know something about the structure and function of the
normal knee, or would have to mistakenly believe that the knee is
round.
C.

What Does the Limited Data Show?

There is no published data at the time of this writing on how
accurate DTCA of restricted, surgically implanted medical devices
is. There is some published data on the accuracy of DTCA of
robotic surgical systems—complicated medical devices, which,
though not restricted devices, are complex prescription devices
that are temporarily inserted into the body during minimally
invasive surgical procedures.
The ability of hospitals and
surgeons/surgical groups to offer advanced laparoscopic surgical
services is a cornerstone of marketing advanced surgical programs
in surgical oncology, gynecology, urology, and other medical
specialties and, along with interventional cardiology services
(coronary artery stents, minimally invasive aneurysm, and heart
valve repairs) are among the most profitable items for hospitals,
academic medical centers, and surgical specialty groups.
40. There are specific content requirements for DTCA of prescription drugs
in broadcast media as well as the basic requirements for promotional labeling and
prescription drug advertising contained in 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(d). See also How
Can an Ad Violate the Law?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs
/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/PrescriptionDrugAdvertising/UCM076768.htm
#law_violation_how (last updated Sept. 13, 2012). Though one might disagree
with the degree to which pharmaceutical manufacturers strictly adhere to such
guidelines and with the notion of whether DTCA should be allowed at all, there is
little controversy at present with efforts of prescription drug manufacturers to
provide safety risk information in their advertisements to consumers.
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Many of the specialty surgical services noted use the da Vinci
41
robotic surgical system developed by Intuitive Surgical, Inc.
DTCA by surgeons and hospitals has been an ongoing activity for
more than half a decade. At this point, some data has accumulated
on how this particular prescription medical device is promoted to
consumers in the field of women’s cancer services, the surgical
specialty that has the longest and most expansive experience with
use of the medical device. The little data available is not
encouraging.
Because of current trends in marketing to
consumers, all of the investigations have focused on internet-based
promotions, such as hospital websites.
42
In a paper presented at the March 2012 annual meeting of
the Society of Gynecologic Oncology—the oldest and most
prestigious international organization in the world devoted
exclusively to gynecologic cancer—investigators from Columbia
University College of Physicians and Surgeons in New York City,
and Carolinas Medical Center in Charlotte, North Carolina
analyzed the content, quality, and accuracy of information
provided on hospital websites about robotic gynecologic surgery.
The study was a systematic analysis of randomly chosen hospitals
with more than 200 beds; the chosen hospitals evaluated were
predominately in (moving from east to west) New York,
43
Pennsylvania, Georgia, Illinois, Colorado, and California.
The
authors analyzed the promotions of a robotic surgical system
medical device for information on clinical claims of effectiveness,
assertions of institutional superiority, ease of access to information
about the medical device, and use of emotionally driven
44
marketing.
More than half of the advertising was for cancerrelated conditions, and between one-half and two-thirds of the
promotions used either stock photographs or stock narratives from
45
the manufacturer.
One-third of the websites specifically
mentioned the name of the company in promotions for da Vinci

41. See generally INTUITIVE SURGICAL, http://www.intuitivesurgical.com (last
visited Jan. 25, 2013).
42. Maria B. Schiavone et al., The Commercialization of Robotic Surgery:
Unsubstantiated Marketing of Gynecologic Surgery by Hospitals, 207 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 174.e1 (2012).
43. Id. at 174.e1–.e2.
44. Id. at 174.e2–.e3. The analysis in the paper was based on descriptive
statistics. Id. at 174.e2.
45. Id. at 174.e2–.e3.
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46

hysterectomy for benign surgical conditions.
Over 6% of
promotions for gynecologic-cancer surgery specifically mentioned
“improved cancer outcomes” despite a paucity of published data
that demonstrates that patients who undergo robotic surgery, as
opposed to more conventional surgery, actually have higher cure
47
rates for their malignancy.
Superiority claims were supported by evidence-based data in
48
fewer than 15% of advertisements. Cost (3.7% of promotions),
complications (1.6% of claims), and operating time compared to
conventional surgery (3.7% of advertisements) were rarely, if ever,
49
discussed. The conclusions of the authors in this first-of-its-kind
marketing analysis were that “[m]arketing of robotic gynecologic
surgery [by hospitals] is widespread. Much of the content [of this
marketing] is not based on high-quality data, fails to present
alternative procedures, and relies on stock text and images” from
50
the manufacturer of surgical robots.
Potential limitations and
51
The low incidence of
costs are rarely presented to patients.
medical-device-related, complication-rate reporting and the virtual
total absence of medical-device-related safety information strongly
suggests that there is no realistic attempt for such DTCA to comply
with the FDA statutory requirements.
52
Recent expert commentary by prominent academicians in
obstetrics and gynecology has also pointed out that hospital
promotions for robotic surgery on billboards and the Internet
provide misleading information to patients and consumers. Much
of the content of the promotions is provided by the manufacturers,
does not provide accurate evidence-based information, and
provides either false information about benefits and complications
or ignores the risks and costs altogether. As things currently stand,
manufacturers of devices do have to comply with statutory
requirements for balance of information and content, but rarely
have to do so since they rarely advertise; the medical groups need

46. Id.
47. Id. at 174.e3 (finding 6.3% of promotions described improved cancer
outcomes and 9.4% of promotions described higher lymph node yields).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 174.e1.
51. Id. at 174.e3.
52. See, e.g., Andrew M. Kaunitz, The Promotion of Robotic Gynecologic Surgery by
Hospitals: Are Our Patients Being Misled?, MEDSCAPE (Oct. 12, 2012), http://
www.medscape.com/viewarticle/772325.
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not comply with statutory requirements for information and rarely
bother to, even though they do almost all of the advertising.
IV. THE OTHER CORE ISSUE: INFORMATION AND EDUCATION
The focus in this article thus far has been on the structure of
DTCA for prescription, restricted, surgically implanted medical
devices in the United States. As has been shown, the amount of
DTCA and the source of the advertising differ for medical devices
and for prescription drugs. Even though the FDA statutory
requirements are similar for broadcast and magazine promotions
for drugs and devices, the former generally comply, while the latter
do not.
All of this raises an interesting, though largely hypothetical,
opportunity to analyze some of the restriction of commercial
speech issues, which have plagued both the FDA and the
pharmaceutical industry over the past twenty years, as they might
apply to the medical devices industry. What if the medical device
industry was to make a determined effort to actively do the majority
of the DTCA of its products on its own without using hospitals and
surgical groups as surrogates? What information should be
contained in the ads in order to comply with the FDA regulations
and recommendations regarding effectiveness and risks for the
products?
Would simply meeting the same requirements
pharmaceutical manufacturers have to meet in broadcast
advertisements (e.g., a 1-800 number, balanced presentation of
risks and benefits with significant, safety issues emphasized, etc.) be
adequate, or are there limitations on the availability of critical
information that the medical-device industry cannot control that
might prevent the manufacturers from ever being able to provide
information about safety sufficiently educational for consumers?
And if the ads cannot ever be adequately educational, do the
promotions deserve the same level of commercial-speech
protection as the promotions for prescription drugs by commercialdrug manufacturers? I will briefly address these issues prior to
summing up my conclusions.
A comprehensive review of all of the information defects
inherent in any attempt to provide information necessary to meet
statutory requirements for a fair and balanced presentation of all of
the relevant efficacy and safety issues for a complex, restricted,
surgically implanted medical device is beyond the scope of this
article. The following discussion may be viewed as both a summary
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of the information that should appear and an explanation of why
53
such information cannot appear (i.e., it is not available).
Consumers are generally unaware of the indications and
characteristics of medical devices until they become patients.
Unlike the packaging for prescription pharmaceuticals, there is no
54
patient package insert for restricted, surgically implanted medical
devices for patients to read so that they may become familiar with
the indications for the devices as well as the major safety risks and
complications for the devices themselves. Most of these devices are
employed by the physicians to whom patients are referred, so
providing a statement in an advertisement that one should contact
his or her physician is less meaningful in the context of a restricted,
surgically implanted medical device. The primary care physician
from whom the patient gets the referral is virtually never a surgeon
and, unlike the situation with routine prescribing of prescription
drugs, is unlikely to be familiar with the mechanics and problems
with the device. General practice physicians are unlikely to know
enough about complicated medical devices to be able to
meaningfully counsel patients.
Physicians in medical school have extensive and mandatory
exposure to pharmacology and pharmaceuticals from the first two
years of medical school on, but no standardized instruction or
exposure to complex medical devices until they do surgical
rotations. Physicians, as a rule, know less about devices than they
do about pharmaceuticals, just as consumers do. Surgeons (and
consumers) themselves have no equivalent to the Physician Desk
Reference for prescription drugs for prescription medical devices;
there is no readily available source of information or compendium
of medical device labels that may be consulted by patients prior to
having such a device inserted into their body. Patients would need
to be very familiar with the standard medical, non-surgical
treatments of their medical conditions in order to know if and
when they are appropriate candidates for surgically implanted
medical devices.
There is no evidence that either consumers or physicians are
aware of the contours of the medical device approval process at the
FDA in general, or of the fact that some surgically implanted
53.
existing
devices.
54.

Some of this material has been described in greater detail in the one
law review article on the subject of DTCA of restricted Class III medical
See Patsner, supra note 28.
21 C.F.R. pt. 201 (2012).
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devices can be marketed in the United States without undergoing
extensive testing for safety and effectiveness. Nor is long-term
safety and efficacy data (e.g., how long will the newest type of hip
implant last?) a routine part of the medical device marketing
approval process, even if the device has a PMA—comparative
effectiveness data is sorely lacking. Another complicating factor is
that the approvals for drugs at the Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research and biologicals at the Center for Biologics Evaluation and
Research are at least almost always made by physicians, whereas at
the Center for Devices and Radiological Health, the ultimate
decision for devices is frequently made by non-medical personnel,
such as engineers, who neither understand clinical medicine nor
are trained to balance clinical medical efficacy versus patient
medical safety.
Even if these defects—labeling; the medical device approval
process; physician training and exposure to complex medical
devices; the FDA’s numerous problems with the way it approves or
clears medical devices for marketing in the United States; and the
virtual lack of long-term safety and device failure rate for restricted,
surgically implanted medical devices—could all be corrected, there
is still the problem of the lack of information on surgical and
hospital experience, performance, and complication rates. There
is a profound lack of reliable, useful information on surgical
outcomes using devices for individual surgeons, surgical groups,
hospitals, surgical centers, and academic medical centers, which
can allow consumers to determine the comparative skill and safety
for restricted, implantable medical devices. This is an inherent
defect for both physicians and consumers, and unique for devices
compared to drugs. In the absence of such information, fair
balance and meaningful content requirements for a restricted,
surgically implanted medical device for DTCA cannot be met.
Even this short list and discussion illustrates that there are
significant obstacles to providing the requisite relevant safety and
efficacy information for a complex medical device in a DTCA.
Some of the defects, such as the lack of availability and
transparency about surgeons and hospitals, are clearly outside the
ability of either a medical device manufacturer or the FDA to access
or control. This would be true even if referring physicians were
eminently knowledgeable about medical devices and even if the
problems in the medical device approval process did not exist. But,
if the primary justification for protecting the commercial speech
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rights of manufacturers of pharmaceuticals, vaccines, medical
devices and other medical products regulated by the FDA is that
the advertisements and promotions are educational and fully
55
informative about relative risks and benefits, the protection may
not be deserved if the advertisements cannot be educational in the
way in which DTCAs of prescription drugs are.
At present, the purported educational purpose of DTCA
cannot be met because of the inherent information defects and
limitations on information for consumers. All of this raises another
interesting question, which is beyond the scope of this article but
worth considering: Do consumers/patients lose anything by not
being exposed to DTCA for medical devices? At present, there is
no way to know. But one could argue that the absence of such
advertising does not adversely impact overall consumer health and
in fact might actually be of some benefit. DTCA of prescription
drugs is illegal in all Western European countries and this does not
seem to have adversely impacted the health of the patient
population in those countries at all.
V. CONCLUSION: IS THERE A PROBLEM WITH DTCA OF MEDICAL
DEVICES? IF SO, WHOSE PROBLEM IS IT AND HOW
SHOULD IT BE SOLVED?
The medical device industry is likely going to continue to
promote high-tech, profitable, restricted, surgically implantable
medical devices directly to consumers in billboard and magazine
advertisements for the foreseeable future via promotion by
surgeons and hospitals/medical centers. The interests of the
manufacturers and subspecialty healthcare providers are aligned
because the promotion of high technology goes hand in hand with
marketing and profits.
The volume of DTCA in television and other broadcast media
(aside from the Internet) is minimal at the moment. One
explanation for the relative paucity of broadcast advertising by
medical device manufacturers is that they are content to let the
55. The Central Hudson test does not predicate its protection of commercial
speech on the fact that advertisements must be truly educational, Cent. Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), though one could
argue that if advertisements are not educational at all then they are purely to
generate demand for products. In fact, the Supreme Court has allowed potentially
misleading information to survive so long as it is accompanied by a disclaimer.
The Court does not cite evidence establishing the usefulness of disclaimers.
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medical profession do most of the advertising for them. Another
explanation is that television advertising may be too expensive for
surgeons and hospitals to aggressively market in, unlike the
pharmaceutical industry, which has vastly greater financial
resources and is willing to devote up to twenty percent or more of
its revenues to marketing activities. A third alternative is that the
Internet is cheaper, easier, more widespread, and essentially
unregulated. There is no substantive research on Internet-based
advertising for the complicated restricted surgically implantable
devices we have discussed here.
If medical professionals were required to meet FDA statutory
standards for their advertisements, the information provided by the
manufacturer in current advertisements would not be in
compliance. There is no evidence, however, that this situation has
created problems with the FDA for medical device manufacturers.
It is a virtual certainty that these advertisements will never be able
to meet the statutory requirements for either fair and balanced
information or contain all of the relevant information that a
consumer would need in order to make a truly educated decision
regarding the appropriateness of the device for themselves even if
the medical device manufacturers decided to do most of the
advertising themselves. The reasons for this are not completely
under the FDA’s or the medical device industry’s control because,
unlike pharmaceuticals, it is impossible to separate effectiveness
and safety of a device from the surgeon and affiliate institution due
to an almost total lack of transparency. Even if there were
transparency of medical provider/institution performance and
safety information, there is still the lack of safety information for
those devices reaching consumers via 510(k) clearance.
The deficiencies in information are global in the sense that
they apply to all restricted medical devices that are implanted by
surgeons in health care facilities (hospitals or surgical centers) and
insurmountable in the sense that there is no way to separate the
effectiveness and safety of the device from either the non-surgical
alternatives or the competence and safety of the surgeon and the
facility. The lack of transparency of information regarding the
comparative effectiveness of competing medical devices, of devices
versus non-surgical alternatives, or of meaningful, accurate
information on the relative abilities and outcomes for surgeons
simply makes the matter worse.
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If most of the advertising for these complex devices is done by
the medical profession, not industry, the burden of responsibility
for protecting patients and consumers from misleading, false, or
grossly inadequate advertising is not the FDA’s problem, but rather
falls on the individual states, and their respective state medical
boards and attorneys general. Unlike the situation in advertising
and promotion for prescription pharmaceuticals, the main
problem is not the First Amendment and attempts by the FDA to
protect public health by restriction of manufacturers’ commercial
speech. The problem in advertising of restricted, surgically
implanted medical devices is consumer fraud and the regulation of
the medical profession at the state level.
Whether the situation whereby the medical profession does
virtually all of the advertising and promotion to consumers exists
because it is easier or cheaper; or because of the structure and
competition among hospitals; or because of the close ties or
capture of the medical profession and hospitals by the medical
devices industry; or because the industry has determined that it can
make an end-run around the regulations by letting medical
surrogates do the advertising; or if it is because medical device
manufacturers have determined that information defects cannot be
overcome if they do the advertising; or some combination of these
is unknown. What is known is that DTCA of complex, restricted,
surgically implanted medical devices is very different than that for
prescription drugs. So different, in fact, that neither the FDA nor
the First Amendment are where the enforcement battles are likely
to (or should) be fought.
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